Argumenty czy intuicja - co decyduje o ocenie przykładów gettierowskich?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14394/filnau.2024.0005Słowa kluczowe:
Gettier’s cases, arguments, intuitions, thought experimentsAbstrakt
The article investigates whether arguments or intuition are the decisive factor in how people evaluate Gettier’s cases. It surveys competing positions in the debate between advocates of intuition-based assessment and those who emphasize argumentation. In contrast to prior quantitative studies on the evaluation of thought experiments, I report a qualitative study that probes the conscious reasoning processes involved in judging Gettier cases and the potential shifts in those judgments over the course of reflection.
Bibliografia
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Prawa autorskie (c) 2024 Ewa Stępińska

Utwór dostępny jest na licencji Creative Commons Uznanie autorstwa – Użycie niekomercyjne – Bez utworów zależnych 4.0 Międzynarodowe.

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